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Causality Relationship between Central Bank Reforms and 
Inflation: Evidence from Developing Countries
Abstract
This study provides evidence on the relationship between central bank reforms and inflation dynamics in 
a sample of 37 developing countries. We use panel structural break test and Granger non‐causality tests 
on annual inflation and the legal index of central bank independence (CBI), as a proxy of central bank 
reform, over 40 years period. The empirical results indicate a positive effect of central bank independence 
on inflation stabilization. Besides, we find that there exists bi-directional causality between central bank 
reforms and inflation. These findings suggest that central bank independence is beneficial in terms of 
sustained macroeconomic stabilization and should harness among developing countries. In particular, 
reforms should design to give central banks more autonomy in the conduct of monetary policy and financial 
sector regulation. 
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Abstrak
Studi ini memberikan bukti tentang hubungan antara reformasi bank sentral dan dinamika inflasi untuk 
sampel 37 negara berkembang. Kami menggunakan metode panel structural break test dan Granger Non-
causality test untuk data tahunan inflasi dan legal index central bank independence (CBI), sebagai proksi 
dari reformasi bank sentral, selama periode 40 tahun. Hasil empiris menunjukan bahwa independensi 
bank sentral mempunyai efek positive terhadap stabilisasi inflasi. Selain itu, kami juga menemukan adanya 
kausalitas dua arah antara reformasi bank sentral dan inflasi. Temuan tersebut menunjukan bahwa 
independensi bank sentral dalam stabilisasi makroekonomi yang berkelanjutan dan harus dimanfaatkan 
oleh negara- negara berkembang. Secara khusus, reformasi harus dirancang untuk memberikan otonomi 
lebih besar kepada bank sentral dalam melakukan kebijakan moneter dan regulasi sektor keuangan. 
Kata Kunci: independendi bank sentral, inflasi, Negara berkembang, structural break, kausalitas Granger
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Introduction
Central banks hold an essential role in achieving macroeconomic stability, particularly in 
influencing the level of inflation and stability of the exchange rate. Central bank independence 
provides the central bank with autonomy from interference in the pursuance of its monetary 
policy objective and financial sector stability. This condition gives the central bank the 
freedom to focus on the attainment of the monetary policy goal to control the inflation rate 
(Berger et al., 2000), reducing the output gap and unemployment in some countries. Central 
bank independence can classify into three aspects, such as personnel, financial, and policy 
independence. Personnel independence refers to the fact that the government has restricted 
influence on the central bank’s Governor and its Boards. On this, Neumann (1991) argues 
that the public might view government influence as encouraging the central bank to pursue 
the kinds of policies that are in the government’s interests. The second aspect is financial 
independence, which indicates the central bank’s ability to budget and fund its activities 
without resorting to printing money to finance budget deficits (Eijffinger et al., 1998). The 
third is that policy independence reflects on the central bank’s ability to choose an objective, 
instrument, and the desecration to implement the monetary policy without any political 
interference.
One of the primary aims of central bank independence is to address the time-
inconsistency problem as a consequence of the policy that is no longer optimal, in response to 
the original objective (Barro & Gordon, 1983a, b and Rogoff, 1985). This time inconsistency 
problem, if not addressed, leads to inflation bias that occurs when a government interferes 
with a central bank’s operation. In this context, if the central bank knows public inflation 
expectation, it tends to create inflation surprise to increase seignorage and to push the 
employment rate. The later could result in loss of credibility for the central bank that likely to 
hinder its ability to manage inflation expectation through its policy instruments? In a sense, 
this suggests that delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank is anticipated 
to promote economic agent’s trust in future monetary stability. Therefore an independent 
central bank is better positioned to eliminate the time inconsistency problem of monetary 
policy (Rogoff, 1985, and Bernanke, 2010). Empirically, however, the debate has shifted to 
whether it is central bank reforms that drive down inflation or the inflation experience that 
creates desires for countries to implement central bank reforms.
In the empirical literature, this debate on the causality between central bank independence 
and inflation has received and continues to attract considerable attention. Grilli et al. (1991) 
show that there is a significant negative relationship between CBI and inflation. Even after 
splitting the sample periods into four decades, the negative relationship seems to persist. 
This result suggests that countries with a low central bank independence index experience a 
higher inflation rate compared to their counterpart. Cukierman et al. (1992) and Alpanda 
&Honig (2014) argue that a substantial effect of inflation when a low degree of central bank 
independence, whereas less independent central banks, produce a higher rate of inflation. 
Cukierman et al. (1992) estimated the CBI index for 72 countries using actual 
independence as the turnover rate of the central bank governor, and divided the sample into 
developing and developed countries for the period between 1950 and 1989. They found a 
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negative relationship between CBI and inflation only for advanced economies but did not 
find the same result for developing economies. They show that the role of the turnover rate 
of governor contributes significantly to the reduction of inflation for developing countries, 
but not for developed countries. Also, they found a two-way causality between inflation and 
central bank independence. In contrast, Alesina & Summers (1993) employed simple plots 
to capture the relationship between CBI and inflation for 16 developed countries over the 
sample period 1955-1988 and establish a negative relationship between these two variables. 
Similarly, Jonsson (1995), Cukierman et al. (1992), and Arnone & Romelli (2013) show 
that there is a negative relationship between CBI and inflation. After splitting the period into 
three different decades, Jonsson (1995) show that CBI became the most critical aspect of 
reducing inflation during the high inflation period (1972-1979) for their sample.
In terms of causality, Dreher et al. (2008) estimated the existence of a causality 
relationship between central bank independence and inflation for 137 countries over the 
sample period 1970-2004 and found that causality runs from inflation to turn over rate. 
Similarly, Ahsan et al. (2008) conducted a Granger causality test on central bank independence 
and inflation on Asia Pacific countries but did not find a two-way causality between the two 
variables. According to Landstrom (2013), there is no evidence from correlation statistic to 
determine whether a higher degree of central bank independence leads to low inflation, or 
whether the causality lies in the opposite direction. Cole (2018) show that the beneficial 
effects of forwarding guidance increase if a central bank pursues price-level targeting instead 
of inflation targeting.
The empirical literature is, therefore, inconclusive on the relationship and direction of 
causality between central bank independence and inflation. The significant limitations of the 
existing empirical literature arise from the estimation of structural VARs and co-integration 
to establish the causal relationship between central bank independence and inflation without 
accounting for structural breaks. 
This study addresses this limitation by employing the structural break test proposed 
by Bai & Perron (2003), which is elaborated in Westerlund (2006) to examine the history 
of inflation in developing countries and the direction of causality. This paper evaluates the 
idea that the level of central bank independence explains the inflation moderation in these 
economies, as a higher index of independence implies that the central bank is focused more 
on attaining price stability. We identify the structural break in the inflation rate, which relates 
to the exact moment of each central bank’s change in the law that caused an increase in the 
level of independence. Structural changes in inflation could also attribute to central bank 
reform, which changes the monetary policy and central bank objective, such as adopting 
inflation targeting. If central bank reforms have been successful, it expects that it will result 
in a structural change in inflation. Griffin (2011) shows the impact of structural changes in 
the inflation rate. However, their binary approach is limited in explaining the shift associated 
with the intercept, trend, or CBI reform regime. Our approach base on the LM co-integration 
test that is appropriate for multiple structural breaks, both the levels and trended regression.
We employ the legal index of central bank independence to estimates the structural 
breaks and investigate the causal relationship between central bank independence and 
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inflation. Further, we evaluate whether a higher degree of central bank independence leads 
to lower inflation or higher inflation leads to the central bank becoming more independent 
in developing countries by using Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012) panel Granger non-causality 
test. The panel Granger non-causality test is suitable for heterogeneous panels since it assumes 
that there are identical lag orders and balanced panels for all cross-countries (Kumar 2011). 
Given that our panel data comprise of 37 developing countries, this technique is the most 
appropriate to show a causal relationship between central bank independence and inflation.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the econometric 
methodology and data used for our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the results and 
discussions. Section 4 concludes and provides areas for extensions.
 
Method
We use a panel dataset for a sample of 37 developing countries covering the period 
1972 - 20161. Our choice of developing countries in the sample is based on the availability 
of consistent time series data on all the variables of interest. The variable consists of annual 
inflation and an index for central bank reforms. Inflation measures as an annual percentage 
change of the consumer price index that derives from the International Financial Statistic 
of the international monetary (IMF) database. Central bank reform measure using the legal 
CBI index that originally constructed by Cukierman et al. (1992). The index ranges between 
0 and 1, where higher values denote a greater degree of central bank independence while 
the value of 0 indicates that the central bank is not independent. Our legal CBI index data 
construct from aggregate weighted taken from Garriga (2016) dataset, covering the period 
1972-2012. We use the same weights to extend the legal CBI index to 2016 for countries in 
our sample. Our extension is tractable given that there have been no changes in the central 
bank’s law for the sample countries over the period.
The empirical model using Westerlund (2006) that based on a test co-integration, which 
allows for the presence of structural breaks in the deterministic variable of a co-integrating 
panel regression. It is Lagrange Multiplier (LM) for the null hypothesis of co-integration 
that allows for the possibility of multiple structural breaks in both the level and trend of a 
co-integrated panel regression. Westerlund (2006) indicates that the test is general enough to 
allow for endogenous regressors, serial correlation, and an unknown number of breaks that 
may locate at different dates for different individuals. The test can be conducted through 
two different approaches to check for the structural breaks in the data, namely: known and 
unknown breakpoints test statistics.
In this paper, we employ the test for unknown breakpoints based on the extension of 
Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to establish the location of the breakpoints of inflation for each 
country. First, we consider the following panel regressions with m breaks (m+1 regimes):
1 The countries in the sample are; Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia
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   (1)
Where yt is the observed dependent variable for country  at time  and  
are vector of covariates, and the corresponding vector of coefficients are β and δj for 
j =1,…,m + 1. The structural break points (T1,…,Tm) are explicitly unknown. The purpose 
is to estimate the unknown regression coefficients together with the break points when T 
observations on (yt, xt, zt ) are available. The variance of the error term εt does not need to be 
constant. It is important to note that break in the variance of the error term is permitted, as 
long as it occurs at the same date with the parameters.
The estimation method base on the least-squares principle. In this approach, each 
partition, the associated least squares estimates of the parameters β and δj are obtained by 
minimizing the sum of squared residuals based on the solution of following optimization 
problem:
  (2)
Where  denotes the vector of estimated structural breakpoints. The 
parameters , and  are cointegration estimator based on partition Ti = (T1,...,Tm)’ of the 
structural breaks. Therefore the breakpoint estimators can be considered as global minimizers 
of the objective function. Given that breakpoints are discrete parameters and can only take a 
finite number of values, they can be estimated by a grid search.
The estimation is performed in two steps. First, Bai & Perron (2003) adopt a 
dynamic programming algorithm to estimate unknown regression parameters and unknown 
breakpoints ( ), and use the result to generate the sum of squared residuals for each break. 
The next step involves estimating the number of breaks using the sum of squared residuals 
from the previous step. The two steps are repeated m times to obtain a vector of estimated 
breakpoints for each individual country in the sample. The LM statistic is estimated using  
to substitute  for each individual.
The panel Granger causality provides useful information related to temporality, 
erogeneity, and independence (Kumar, 2011). Temporality means that the previous values of 
a variable  can cause another variable . The standard method to examine causality is the 
Granger non-causality test for heterogeneous panel data models. We therefore closely follow 
the approach proposed by Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012) that based on the individual country 
Wald statistics of Granger non-causality averaged across the cross-section units.
If we consider two covariance stationary variables, denoted  and , observed on T periods and on N individuals. As suggested by Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012), for each 
individual country , at time , we consider the following linear model 
for testing the relationship between our two variables of interest:
  (3)
Where  denotes the maximum number of lags that is identical for all cross-section units 
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of the panel and also assume the panel is balanced,  is the regression 
coefficient of the slope of xi,t−k t denotes the time period, the autoregressive parameter  is 
coefficient of yi,t−k . The individual effect αi is supposed to be fixed over time. Initial conditions 
of the individual processes yi,t and xi,t are given and observable. The null hypothesis for the 
test is given by:
H0 : βi,1 = ...βi,K = 0 ∀i = 1,...,N
Which corresponds to the absence of causality among the variables in the panel. The test 
assumes that there can be causality for some variables but not necessarily all. Therefore the 
alternative is given by:
H1 : βi,1 = ...βi,K = 0 ∀i = 1,...,N1
βi,1 ≠ 0 or ...or βi,K ≠ 0 ∀i = N1 + 1, ...,N
Where N1 ∈ [0, N – 1] is unknown, 0 < N1/N < 1. If N1 = N, there is no causality for any 
individuals in the model but if N1 = 0, there is causality for all individuals in the model. N1 
must be strictly smaller than N, otherwise there is no causality for all individuals. 
According to Lopez and Weber (2017), conducting the Dumitrescu and Hurlin 
(2012) Granger non-causality test involves first running the N individual regression based on 
equation (3); second, examine F-tests of the K linear hypotheses βi1 = ... = βiK = 0 to get the 
individual country Wald statistics, Wi . In the third step we compute average Wald statistic.
      (6)
Where: Wi denotes the standard adjusted Wald statistic for the ith individual country observed 
during period T. This test is designed to detect causality at the panel-level; therefore rejecting 
H0 is not sufficient for one to conclude that there is no causality for some individuals
Results and Discussions
Before estimation of the structural breaks and causality between the legal index of CBI 
and inflation, we first examined the measure of dispersion, central tendency, and volatility 
of the two variables. Table 1 indicates that the average inflation during the sample period 
was 62.06 percent, with a very high variability of up to 515.95 over the sample period. The 
high variability is mostly due to the difference in the inflation experience of these developing 
countries. The variability ranges between a deflation of 9.81 percent and a hyperinflation 
of up to 11,749.64 percent. The degree of central bank independence averaged 0.47, with 
a relatively lower variability signified by the standard deviation of 0.188 and dispersion 
between 0.13 and 0.95. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Inflation 62.057 515.954 -9.809 11,749.64
CBI 0.474 0.188 0.134 0.951
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The large variability in inflation over the period suggests that some countries experienced 
very high inflation while others hand negative inflation before the adoption of central bank 
reforms. In such cases, the motivation to adopt central bank independence could have driven 
by the desire to reign-in on inflation and to exploit the inverse relationship established in 
Alesina & Summers (1993), Bodea & Hicks (2015), and Martin (2015) that countries with 
high CBI index experience low inflation. 
We use the least square approach of Bai & Perron (2003) suggested by Westerlund 
(2006) to estimate the number of breaks and their location. Bai & Perron (2003) can be 
used to detect multiple structural breaks by assuming unknown structural breakpoints. This 
technique requires a specific number of breaks; hence we decided to apply only one break 
due to a short period covered by our time series data2. The breakpoints for each country and 
the trend of inflation illustrate in Appendix I. Table 2 suggest that central bank reforms that 
changed their level of independence may have been responsible for the structural break in 
inflation. The long-run relationship between CBI and inflation could have caused by the 
existence of structural breaks in the data. These breaks in the inflation may be a result of 
reform in the monetary policy and the central bank’s objective or a change from external 
factors that can influence inflation, such as the rise in oil price.
Since central bank independence has implemented in many countries throughout 
the 1990s and early 2000s (Acemoglu et al., 2008), it is essential to evaluate the impact 
on inflation. The moderate and high inflation countries are grouped into two categories, 
comprising of countries that experience breaks before 1990 and those that had their break 
after 1990. For a moderate inflation group, seven countries (Barbados, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, and Tunisia) had a break before 1990 where 
among the high inflation group, Bolivia, Chile, Ghana, Mexico, and Uganda experienced 
break before 1990. 
The dates for those breaks correspond with the oil price fall at the beginning of the 
1980s, which suggests that many countries could have shifted their focus to maintaining price 
stability. The results further indicate that the best countries in the moderate inflation group 
(Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Nepal, 
Paraguay, South Africa, and Tanzania) experience their break after the 1990s. Similarly, we 
find that the high inflation countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, 
Turkey, Uruguay, and Zambia had their structural breaks after the 1990s. The patterns in 
these countries characterized by an increase in the degree of the legal index of central bank 
independence. However, some countries such as Ethiopia, Mauritania, Sri Lanka, Suriname, 
and Venezuela had year-long break time after central bank independence has implemented. 
This condition could partly be a limitation in our approach that relies on only one structural 
break test.
2 Although it is possible to apply multiple breaks, we only employ one break due to the fact that our time period 
is short on account of annual time series data. We also deviate from multiple breaks since it sometimes provide conflicting 
dates of break points.
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Table 2. Structural Break Tests
Country Break date CB Reform(s)
Argentina 1991 1992
Barbados 1983 1998
Bolivia 1986 1995
Brazil 1995 1988
Chile 1978 19,751,989
Colombia 1992 1999
Costarica 1996 1995
Egypt 1996 1975, 2004
Ethiopia 2005 1994
Ghana 1985 2002
Guatemala 1997 2002
Honduras 1998 1996
Indonesia 1999 1999
Kenya 1995 1996
Malaysia 1983 1994, 2009
Mauritania 2007 2007
Mexico 1989 1993
Morocco 1996 2006
Nepal 2000 2002
Nicaragua 1992 1992, 1999
Nigeria 1997 1998, 2007
Pakistan 1978 1994, 1997
Paraguay 1995 1995
Philippines 1986 1993
Peru 1992 1992
Tanzania 1997 1994, 2006
Thailand 1982 2008
Trinidad and Tobago 1985 1995
Tunisia 1988 1988, 2006
Turkey 2001 2001
Uganda 1990 1993, 2000
Uruguay 1995 1995, 2010
Venezuela 2011 1992, 2008
Zambia 1997 1996
Note: The breakpoints were estimated using the Bai and Perron (2003) procedure
To understand the implications of the structural break, we divided our samples into 
two categories comprising of countries that had their break before the reforms, and those 
had their break after the reforms. The result in Table 2 reveals that 20 countries had a 
break before, while 17 countries had their structural break after the central bank reforms. 
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Among the countries with moderate inflation, 12 countries had their structural breaks before 
reforms, namely Barbados, Colombia, Egypt, Guatemala, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Trinidad and Tobago. In contrast, ten developing 
countries, among which includes Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Honduras, Indonesia, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Tunisia, experience their structural breaks after 
central bank reforms. In the case of the high inflation group, seven countries, including Chile, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zambia, encountered break after reforms.
Meanwhile, eight countries, namely Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ghana, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Suriname, and Uganda, had a break before central bank reforms. Based on this evidence, we 
can conclude that central bank reform is associated with inflation. However, we have to 
examine more deeply whether reform causes inflation, or it is the inflation experience that 
drives the desire for the reform.
We run the panel Granger non-causality test for heterogeneous panel data models 
following the approach of Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012). We also utilize the group mean 
Wald test statistic, to establish the causality relationship between inflation and the legal index 
of central bank independence. The advantage of the Granger non-causality test is that it can 
be employed even in models that possibly integrated and in co-integrated systems without 
pre-testing for unit roots and co-integration. We set the number of lags in this test is two.
Table 3 present the findings from the estimation of the two null hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis is that CBI does not homogeneously cause inflation, and the other hypothesis is 
that inflation does not homogeneously cause CBI. The result of our estimation indicates that 
both hypotheses rejected. This result consistent with Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012), that also 
find a bidirectional causality between CBI and inflation. The causality runs from the legal 
index of CBI to inflation, and the reverse from inflation to CBI is also true. Our empirical 
finding is also consistent with Cukierman et al. (1992), and Brumm (2011) that finds two-
way causality between CBI and inflation. 
Table 3. Panel Non-Causality Test
Null Hypothesis Wald Statistics  Statistics Probability values
CBI does not cause Inflation 4.515 6.552 0.000***
Inflation does not cause CBI 77.938 206.662 0.000***
Moderate Inflation Countries
CBI does not cause Inflation 4.746 5.537 0.000***
Inflation does not cause CBI 4.813 5,678 0.000***
High Inflation Countries
CBI does not cause Inflation 4.176 3.584 0.000***
Inflation does not cause CBI 185.189 317.700 0.000***
Note: Computed from sample data (1972-2016). *** denotes rejection at 1% significance level
This result suggests that inflation variability is high among central banks that have not 
achieved the reforms required for CBI compared to those that have achieved a high level of 
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independence. CBI is more effective in lowering inflation in the presence of high levels of 
banking sector development and institutional quality (Arnone, 2013; Agoba et al., 2017). 
However, Cukierman et al. (2002) also find that during the early stages of liberalization, the 
CBI is unrelated to inflation. Perera et al. (2013), and Posso & Tawadros (2013) show that 
a negative relationship between central bank financial strength and inflation. CBI increases 
inflation in lowest-income countries (Ftiti et al., 2017).
Our results still indicate bi-directional causality between CBI and inflation by Splitting 
the sample into high inflation and low, moderate inflation countries. Although the Wald 
statistics are very high for the causality from inflation to CBI for the high inflation countries, 
it is significant. This empirical finding is consistent with the results and implication of 
structural breaks on the inflation dynamics of developing countries discussed in the previous 
subsection. The subsection provided evidence, which suggests that some countries that 
experienced breakpoint date after reforms experienced low and stable inflation. On the other 
hand, countries that had inflation structural break dates before their central bank reforms 
could have a drive into the adoption of CBI reforms to maintain low and stable inflation.
Our results give credence to central bank independence as a crucial requirement for 
macroeconomic stability and suggest that CBI and inflation drive one another. The choice 
of the indicator used to measure the level of central bank independence may influence the 
results. Using indicators such as political independence, financial independence, and turnover 
of governors may produce different results from those established in this study. 
Conclusion
This study provided evidence on the relationship and causality between central bank 
reforms and inflation using annual panel data from a sample of 37 developing countries 
over the period 1972 to 2016. The significant contribution of this paper was the adoption 
of structural break test based on the estimation approach of Bai & Perron (2003), and the 
Granger non‐causality tests proposed by Dumitrescu & Hurlin (2012) to capture the breaks 
and establish the direction of causality on panel data. The empirical results indicate that a high 
degree of central bank independence leads to low and stable inflation, implying that central 
bank reforms are crucial for attaining macroeconomic stability. In particular, we found that 
some countries experienced a break date before the 1990s, which can partly be attributed to 
the reversal of the oil price shock and drives towards central bank policy autonomy. The rest 
of the countries’ breaks came after the 1990s, at the time, when many countries had begun 
to devolve powers of policy independence to central banks. On this, our result shows that a 
total of 20 countries had a break before their central bank reforms, and 17 countries had a 
break after the reform, which suggests that for some central banks, reforms were a driver for 
the structural breaks. The results from the Granger non‐causality tests indicate a bidirectional 
causality relationship between CBI and inflation. This result suggests that high inflation may 
have forced some countries to implement central bank reforms, and in most cases, increased 
central bank independence led to lower inflation. 
The empirical finding is consistent with the theoretical concept that central bank 
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reforms lead to low and stable inflation. Establishing the direction of causality is essential in 
ensuring the effectiveness of the reforms. In terms of policy implications, policymakers could 
focus on increasing the degree of independence through a sound legal framework. Measures 
to strengthen the capacity of the central banks to implement monetary action should harness 
to foster sustained macroeconomic stability and long-run economic growth. 
Our finding only utilized the legal index of central bank independence. Given that 
the other measures, namely index based on the turnover rate of central bank governors, and 
the index based on governance are essential in gauging the level of independence, it is vital 
to explore whether these indices also indicate that central bank reforms lower and stabilizes 
inflation. Another interesting question is whether the effect of CBI on inflation is permanent 
or transitory. 
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